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Abstract
Three correlation theorems for Boolean functions are presented with applications to cryptanal-
ysis of block ciphers and stream ciphers. ? 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Various methods based on the analysis of linear correlation have been developed
and successfully applied to the design and analysis of cryptographical algorithms. The
strongest cryptoanalytical method for the DES algorithm is the linear cryptanalysis
method presented by Matsui in [6], which makes use of correlations between the input
and output of the round function of DES. Correlation attacks are well established in
the analysis of stream ciphers, see for example [3,7,9]. In these papers, correlation
methods for combiner generators with memory are developed.
The purpose of this paper is to unify some previous approaches and to present new
applications of correlation methods in cryptanalysis. We present three theorems on cor-
relations for Boolean functions. The :rst theorem is suitable for establishing correlation
relations over iterated functions, such as round functions of iterated block ciphers or
memory update functions in combiners with memory. The second theorem is useful for
the estimation of correlations on the average over the keys, and is already presented
in [8]. The third theorem determines the correlation between two Boolean functions
with partially shared input. It has various potential applications in cryptanalysis. In this
paper, it is applied to the analysis of correlations between the input and output of a
combiner over a period of a part of the input, which is typically much shorter than
the period of the entire keystream generator. In particular, we show that the initial
state of total length L of linear feedback shift registers feeding into a combiner, can
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be typically analyzed with complexity of O(2L=2) steps given a keystream segment of
length O(2L=2).
In Section 2, we de:ne correlation as a combinatorial concept and present Walsh
transform as a tool for its calculation. The correlation theorems are presented in Section
3. Applications to iterated functions are given in Section 4, and application to, what
we call ultimate divide and conquer attack, is given in Section 5.
2. Correlation and Walsh transform
We denote by Vn the n-dimensional linear space over the :nite :eld GF(2) formed
by sequences (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) of length n of elements of GF(2). In particular, we denote
V = GF(2). The usual inner product of two elements x; w ∈ Vn is de:ned as
w · x = (w1; w2; : : : ; wn) · (x1; x2; : : : ; xn) = w1x1 + w2x2 + · · ·+ wnxn;
where the sum is computed modulo 2. We use the standard combinatorial de:nition of
correlation between two Boolean functions.
Denition 1. Let f; g :Vn → V be Boolean functions. The correlation between f and
g is
c(f; g) = 2−n(#{x ∈ Vn |f(x) = g(x)} − #{x ∈ Vn |f(x) = g(x)}):
Clearly, c(f; g)=c if and only if the probability that f(x)=g(x) is equal to 12 (1+c),
where x is considered as a uniformly distributed random variable in Vn.
In some cases to be considered in this paper, the functions depend on several vari-
ables, and the correlations are considered between functions where some of the variables
are :xed. Then we also use the notation c(f; g)=cx(f(x); g(x)) to indicate the variable
with respect to which the correlation is computed.
The Walsh transform is closely related to the concept of correlation and oGers a
useful tool for its computation and analysis.
Denition 2. The Walsh transform of a Boolean function f :Vn → V is
Wf(w) =
∑
x∈Vn
(−1)f(x)+w·x; w ∈ Vn;
where the sum is taken over integers.
Then we have the following relationships:
c(f; g) = 2−nWf−g(0);
Wf(w) = 2nc(f; Lw);
where Lw is the linear Boolean function de:ned as Lw(x) = w · x, for x ∈ Vn.
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3. Correlation theorems
The :rst of the three correlation theorems to be presented generalizes Lemma 1
of [7] and formula 16 of [2]. It shows how correlations propagate over consecutive
application of functions, a structure that is most common in cryptographic algorithms.
Theorem 3. Given functions f :Vn × Vk → V and g :Vm → Vk we set
h(z; x) = f(z; g(x)); z ∈ Vn; x ∈ Vm:
Then; for all u ∈ Vn; v ∈ Vm;
cx; z(h(z; x); u · z + v · x) =
∑
w∈Vk
cz;(f(z; ); u · z + w · )cx(w · g(x); v · x):
Proof. By expressing the correlations in terms of Walsh transform we get,∑
w∈Vk
cz;(f(z; ); u · z + w · )cx(w · g(x); v · x)
=
∑
w∈Vk
2−(n+k)
∑
z;
(−1)f(z;)+u·z+w·2−m
∑
x
(−1)w·g(x)+v·x
=2−(m+n+k)
∑
x;;z
(−1)f(z;)+u·z+v·x
∑
w∈Vk
(−1)w·+w·g(x)
= 2−(m+n)
∑
x;z
(−1)f(z;g(x))+u·z+v·x
= cx;z(h(z; x); u · z + v · x):
The second theorem deals with the situation, which is not only common but inherent
in cryptographic designs, where a function has diGerent kinds of inputs, such as plain-
text and key, for example. The key variable is held constant over multiple uses of the
encryption function, while plaintext varies. This theorem can be applied to determine
the amount of correlation between the plaintext and the ciphertext obtained using a
:xed key on the average over the keys. If it can assumed that, for all keys, the be-
haviour of the encryption function is similar particularly with respect to correlations,
then this average value is useful for estimating correlations for an arbitrary, unknown
:xed key.
The proof of this theorem is given in [8] where it was used for analyzing features
such as approximate linear hulls in the linear cryptanalysis method introduced by Matsui
in [6]. It can be also seen as a generalization of the Parseval’s theorem which is
obtained by setting n= 0.
Theorem 4. Let f :Vn × Vk → V be a Boolean function. Then; for all u ∈ Vn;
2−k
∑
y∈Vk
cx(f(x; y); u · x)2 =
∑
v∈Vk
cx;y(f(x; y); u · x + v · y)2:
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The third correlation theorem gives an expression of the correlation of a sum of
two functions sharing some common input in terms of the separate correlations for
the individual functions. In the case when the common input is nil, this theorem gives
Lemma 3, “Piling-up lemma” of [6] as a consequence.
Theorem 5. Let f :Vn × Vk → V and g :Vm × Vk → V be Boolean functions. Then;
for all u ∈ Vn; w ∈ Vm;
cx;y; z(f(x; y) + g(z; y); u · x + w · z)
=
∑
v∈Vk
cx;y(f(x; y); u · x + v · y)cy;z(g(z; y); v · y + w · z):
Proof. By expressing the correlations on the right-hand side of the claimed equality
in terms of Walsh transform we get∑
v∈Vk
2−(n+k)
∑
x;y
(−1)f(x;y)+u·x+v·y2−(m+k)
∑
y′ ;z
(−1)g(z;y′)+v·y′+w·z
=2−(n+m+2k)
∑
x;y;y′ ;z
(−1)f(x;y)+g(z;y′)+u·x+w·z
∑
v
(−1)v·(y+y′)
= 2−(n+m+k)
∑
x;y;z
(−1)f(x;y)+g(z;y)+u·x+w·z
= cx;y; z (f(x; y) + g(z; y); u · x + w · z):
In Section 5, this result is applied to the case, where the two functions are equal,
as in the following corollary.
Corollary 6. Let f :Vn × Vk → V be a Boolean function. Then; for all u ∈ Vn;
cx;y; z(f(x; y) + f(z; y); u · (x + z)) =
∑
v∈Vk
cx;y(f(x; y); u · x + v · y)2:
In particular, we see that the correlation cx;y; z(f(x; y)+f(z; y); u · (x+ z)) is always
positive. In some cases it is feasible to determine each non-zero term in the sum
of squared correlations. An example of this is given in Section 5. If the number of
non-negative correlations cx;y(f(x; y); u · x + v · y); v ∈ Vk , is large, or diKcult to
determine, then Theorem 5 oGers the option to derive a lower bound to the correlation
by including in the summation only the largest correlations.
4. Correlation over rounds of iterated ciphers
Iteration of the same function over a number of rounds is most common in crypto-
graphic algorithms. Block ciphers are constructed by iterating a bijective round-function
to form a substitution–permutation network or a Feistel network. Some key stream
generators use combiners with memory where the memory contents are updated, using
a combiner function and the previous contents of the memory as part of input.
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4.1. DES-like ciphers
The block cipher DES is de:ned by giving its round function
(x(i)L ; x
(i)
R ) = (x
(i−1)
R ; x
(i−1)
L + f(E(x
(i−1)
R ) + zi));
where x(i)L (x
(i)
R , resp.) is the left (right, resp.) half of the data output from the ith
round and the data input to the (i+1)th round, i=0; 1; : : : ; r, and zi is the key input to
the ith round, i = 1; 2; : : : ; r. The function f is non-linear and its input is longer than
its output. The mapping E is the linear expansion, which extends the short data block
to the same length as the round key zi. The next theorem gives the exact expression
of the correlation between the input and the output over an even number of rounds of
a DES-like cipher. Formula (31) in [2] gives a similar, but less detailed expression.
Theorem 7. Let y=(x(r)L ; x
(r)
R ) be the output from r rounds of a DES-like cipher and
x = (xL; xR) = (x
(0)
L ; x
(0)
R ) be the input. Then
cx(v · y; u · x) =
∑
w∈W
(−1)w·z
r∏
i=1
c(biR · f; Lwi);
where
br = (vL; vR) = v; bi−1 = (biR ; b
i
L + E
twi); for i = 1; 2; : : : ; r;
W =
{
w = (w1; w2; : : : ; wr) | uL + vL +
r=2∑
i=1
Etw2i = 0;
uR + vR +
r=2∑
i=1
Etw2i−1 = 0
}
;
and
z = (z1; z2; : : : ; zr):
Proof. We give the proof for the case r = 2, from which the general case is easily
obtained by induction. We begin by expanding the linear combination of input and
output bits to contain also the intermediate expressions and obtain the following:
u · x + v · y= uL · x(0)L + uR · x(0)R + vL · x(2)L + vR · x(2)R
= uL · x(0)L + uR · x(0)R + vL · x(1)R + vR · (x(1)L + f(E(x(1)R ) + z2)):
We denote 2 = E(x
(1)
R ) + z2, and xor twice w2 · 2 into the expression to get
u · x + v · y= vR · f(2) + w2 · 2 + w2 · z2
+ (Etw2 + vL) · x(1)R + uL · xL + (uR + vR) · xR
= vR · f(2) + w2 · 2 + w2 · z2
+ (Etw2 + vL) · (xL + f(E(xR) + z1)) + uL · xL + (uR + vR) · xR :
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We continue by denoting 1 = E(xR) + z1 and xoring w1 · 1 twice into the expression
to get :nally the following:
u · x + v · y= vR · f(2) + w2 · 2 + w2 · z2
+ (Etw2 + vL) · f(1) + w1 · 1 + w1 · z1
+ (uL + vL + Etw2) · xL + (uR + vR + Etw1) · xR :
Each of the three lines on the right-hand side of this equation is an expression of
one variable 2; 1 or x, in this order. Now observe that 1 and 2 are intermediate
results when computing v · y as a function of x, and they correspond to variable  of
Theorem 3. We proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3 and take correlations over 2; 1
and x, between the part they are involved in the above expression of u · x + v · y and
the all-zero function. Then we take the product of these three correlation coeKcients
and sum over the w-variables, see Theorem 3, which now are w1 and w2. Finally, we
observe that the third correlation coeKcient taken over x
cx((uL + vL + Etw2) · xL + (uR + vR + Etw1) · xR ; 0)
is equal to zero, unless uL + vL + Etw2 = 0 and uR + vR + Etw1 = 0.
The result shows, in particular, how the correlations between input and output linear
combinations of a DES-like cipher depend on the key. If it can be assumed that all,
or almost all keys result in a similar behaviour with respect to the correlations then it
is useful to see what is this behaviour on the average. This cryptanalytic principle was
formulated in [4] as the hypothesis of 7xed-key equivalence.
The following theorem was given without proof in [8] as an application of
Theorem 4. In this paper, we show that it can also be proved as a consequence of
Theorem 7.
Theorem 8. Let y=(x(r)L ; x
(r)
R ) be the output from r rounds of a DES-like cipher and
x = (x(0)L ; x
(0)
R ) be the input. Let z = (z1; z2; : : : ; zr) be the sequence of round keys of
length ‘. We assume that each round key takes all 2‘ values independently of the
other round keys. Then
2−r‘
∑
z
cx(v · y; u · x)2 =
∑
w∈W
r∏
i=1
c(biR · f; Lwi)2;
where br; i = 1; 2; : : : ; r; W and z are de7ned as in Theorem 7.
Proof. By squaring the expressions of cx(v · y; u · x) given in Theorem 7 and then
taking their sum over z we get
∑
z
(∑
w∈W
(−1)w·z
r∏
i=1
c(biR · f; Lwi)
)( ∑
w′∈W
(−1)w′·z
r∏
i=1
c(biR · f; Lw′i )
)
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=
∑
w; w′∈W
r∏
i=1
c(biR · f; Lwi)c(biR · f; Lw′i )
∑
z
(−1)(w+w′)·z
=2r‘
∑
w∈W
r∏
i=1
c(biR · f; Lwi)2;
from where the claim follows.
Average properties of a cipher have always played important role in cryptanalysis
when the analyst has no prior information about the used key. For example, in the
cryptanalysis of the classical VigenNere cipher the index of coincidence is a useful tool
in estimation of the period of the cipher. For each VigenNere period, the expected values
for this statistical characteristic are determined experimentally by analyzing large data,
:rst for each possible :xed key and then taking the average over the keys. On the
other hand, averaging over the keys may not be a good idea when proving security
of a cipher, unless all keys are about equally strong with respect to the attack that is
been analyzed. For example, a linear cipher may have good statistical characteristics
against standard linear cryptanalysis on the average over the keys, but still it breaks
trivially.
4.2. Combiner generators
Extensive analysis of correlation properties of combiner generators in stream ciphers
has been carried out by Meier and StaGelbach in [7] for the summation generator,
and for a general combiner by GoliQc in [3]. We consider a class of binary combiner
generators with the following elements. First, it has a set of n binary linear feedback
shift registers, with primitive feedback polynomials of degrees Li; i=1; 2; : : : ; n. At each
time step t; t=1; 2; : : : ; the output vector xt = (x1t ; x
2
t ; : : : ; x
n
t ) from the shift registers is
taken as input to the output function, which gives the tth keystream bit zt as output,
and which we assume to be a simple xor-function. The output function has one more
bit c0t , the carry bit, as input from the memory. The memory has rm bits in the form
of r vectors cj = (c0j ; c
1
j ; : : : ; c
m−1
j ); j = t − r; t − r + 1; : : : ; t − 1. At each time step t,
the memory update function f takes xt and ct−1; : : : ; ct−r as inputs, and compute the
new memory vector ct . The updated memory contents are then ct ; ct−1; : : : ; ct−r+1. To
summarize:
zt = x1t + x
2
t + · · ·+ xnt + c0t−1;
ct = f(xt ; ct−1; : : : ; ct−r):
In correlation analysis, the main target is the memory update function, which constitutes
the only nonlinear structure in such a design. In [3] it is argued, that it is always possi-
ble to :nd an integer d and linear combinations of output bits zt ; zt−1; : : : ; zt−d and linear
combinations of the corresponding input bits x1t ; : : : ; x
n
t ; x
1
t−1; : : : ; x
n
t−1; : : : ; x
1
t−d; : : : ; x
n
t−d
with non-zero correlation. Such relations originate from correlations between linear
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Table 1
Weight of u c(ct ; ct−1 + u · xt) c(ct ; u · xt)
0 38 0
1 0 38
2 − 18 0
3 0 − 18
4 38 0
combinations of subsequent carry bits and (possibly zero) linear combination of the
LFSR bits.
We consider an example of a summation generator the memory is one bit, i.e.,
c0t = ct , which is set equal to 1, if the number of ones in the vector (ct−1; x
1
t ; : : : ; x
n
t )
is at least n=2 + 1, and equal to 0 otherwise. We assume that n is even, in which
case ct is balanced. Clearly, two consecutive carry bits are positively correlated. Let
n= 4. Then the values of the correlations between linear combinations involving two
consecutive carry bits are easy to determine directly from the de:nition and are given
in Table 1.
The second example of the general combiner generator to be considered is the stream
cipher standard E0 speci:ed for Bluetooth [1]. The parameters are n = 4; m = 2, and
r = 2, and
ct = (c1t ; c
0
t ) = (s
1
t + c
1
t−1 + c
0
t−2; s
0
t + c
0
t−1 + c
0
t−2 + c
1
t−2);
where st=(s1t ; s
0
t ) are the two most signi:cant bits of the three-bit binary representation
of the integer obtained by summing up the integers x1t ; x
2
t ; x
3
t ; x
4
t ; c
0
t−1, and 2c
1
t−1.
The correlation properties of this combiner are determined by the correlations
between the components of st and u · x + v · ct−1 for diGerent values of v and weight
of u. These correlations are given in Table 2.
Given the correlations, one can use Theorem 3 and search for “correlation
relations” between consecutive carry bits. By correlation relation we mean a linear
combination of consecutive carry bits that is equal to zero with certain probability. A
correlation relation is the stronger, the larger is the deviation of its probability from
1
2 , or equivalently, the larger is the absolute value of the correlation between the zero
function and the Boolean function composed of this linear
combination.
One can :nd the strongest correlation relation
c0t + c
0
t−1 + c
0
t−3
between consecutive carry bits by exhaustive search [5]. Its value is calculated using
Theorem 3 as follows:
c(c0t + c
0
t−1 + c
0
t−3; 0) = c(s
0
t ; c
0
t−2 + c
1
t−2 + c
0
t−3)
=
∑
w
c(s0t ; w · ct−1)c(w · ct−1; c0t−2 + c1t−2 + c0t−3)
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Table 2
v1 v0 Weight of u s1t s
0
t s
1
t + s
0
t
0 0 0 0 0 − 58
1 14 0 0
2 0 0 18
3 0 0 0
4 0 0 − 18
0 1 0 14 0 0
1 0 0 18
2 0 0 0
3 0 0 − 18
4 − 14 0 0
1 0 0 58 − 14 0
1 0 0 14
2 − 18 14 0
3 0 0 0
4 18 − 14 0
1 1 0 0 0 14
1 − 18 14 0
2 0 0 0
3 18 − 14 0
4 0 0 − 14
= c(s0t ; c
1
t−1)c(c
1
t−1 + c
1
t−2 + c
0
t−3; c
0
t−2)
= c(s0t ; c
1
t−1)c(s
1
t−1; c
0
t−2) =−
1
4
· 1
4
=
1
16
:
5. Trade-o& between the length of the given keystream segment and exhaustive
search
As seen in the preceding section, a correlation relation between consecutive carry
bits in combiners with memory implies a correlation relation between consecutive input
bits and output bits. High correlations occur even in practical ciphers, and this would
in theory allow doing exhaustive search over the initial contents of the shift registers
given a short segment of the keystream. As estimated by several authors, see [3,6,7],
the data needed to test for the correct initial value (key) is inversely proportional to the
square of the correlation ceoKcient. For the Bluetooth stream cipher, this would mean
that about 256 bits of the keystream is needed. However, doing exhaustive search
over 128-bit initial state is not feasible. Moreover, since the output function is xor,
which is maximum order correlation immune, it is impossible to “divide and conquer”,
that is, to do exhaustive search for the initial contents of only a subset of the LFSR
set.
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5.1. Ultimate divide and conquer
In this section, it is shown that divide-and-conquer attack becomes possible if the
length of the given keystream is longer than that the period p of the shortest (say, the
:rst) LFSR used in the keystream generation. Assume that there is a relation with a
non-zero correlation " between a linear combination of the shift register output bits
(u10x
1
t + · · ·+ un0xnt ) + · · ·+ (u1dx1t−d + · · ·+ undxnt−d)
and the keystream bits
w0zt + w1zt−1 + · · ·+ wdzt−d:
Then it follows by Corollary 6 that we have a correlation relation between a linear
combination of the keystream bits
w0(zt + zt+p) + w1(zt−1 + zt+p−1) + · · ·+ wd(zt−d + zt+p−d)
and a linear combination of the LFSR output bits
u20(x
2
t + x
2
t+p) + · · ·+ un0(xnt + xnt+p) + · · ·+ u2d(x2t−d + x2t+p−d)
+ · · ·+ und(xnt−d + xnt+p−d);
where the output bits from the :rst (the shortest) shift register cancel, since they are
equal.
By Corollary 6, the strength of the correlation over the period p is at least "2.
Further, Corollary 6 shows how this lower bound can be improved. We state this
result in a form of a theorem as follows.
Theorem 9. Assume that in a combiner generator we have the following correlation:
c(w0zt + w1zt−1 + · · ·+ wdzt−d;
(u10x
1
t + · · ·+ un0xnt ) + · · ·+ (u1dx1t−d + · · ·+ undxnt−d)) = " = 0:
Let the lengths of the registers be L1; : : : ; Ln and the periods p1; : : : ; pn. Then given a
keystream of length p1; p2; : : : ; pk + 1="4 + d one can do exhaustive search over the
Lk+1 + · · ·+ Ln bits which form the initial contents of n− k registers.
If the LFSR registers have primitive feedback polynomials, then pi=2Li−1. In most
applications n is even and the lengths Li are about the same. Then given a suKciently
strong correlation between the input bits and the output bits of a combiner generator,
the complexity to determine the complete initial state of length L is about O(2L=2). In
other words, by generating keystream of length O(2L=2) one can successfully carry out
exhaustive search over L=2 bits of the initial state.
5.2. Examples of correlations over subperiods
In this subsection, we determine the ultimate correlations over periods of partial
inputs for the combiner generators discussed in Section 4.2. The summation generator
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has a simple correlation relation
ct + ct−1 = 0
with correlation given in Table 1. Let 0¡k¡n. Then by Corollary 6 the correlation
over the period of k registers can be computed as follows:
c(ct + ct−1 + ct+p + ct+p−1; 0) =
∑
u∈Vk
c(ct + ct−1; u · x′t)2;
where x′t is the input to the computation of ct from the k registers. For k=1, this sum
has only one non-zero term, i.e. the one corresponding to u = 0, and the correlation
is equal to (3=8)2 = 9=64. For k = 2 the sum has two non-zero terms corresponding
to u = (0; 0) and u = (1; 1) and the correlation equals 10=64. For k = 3, the vector u
with weight 2 can be chosen in three diGerent ways, and we get correlation 9=64 +
3(1=64) = 12=64. In this simple case, it is possible to compute the correlations using
the shortest relation.
Computation of the correlations for the Bluetooth E0 combiner is more complicated
due to multiple iteration. We make use of the relation c0t +c
0
t−1 +c
0
t−3 =0. As a typical
example, we show the computations for k=2, when the correlations are combined over
the least common period of two input sequences. Applying :rst Theorem 3, we get
c(c0t + c
0
t−1 + c
0
t−3 + c
0
t+p + c
0
t+p−1 + c
0
t+p−3; 0)
= c(s0t + s
0
t+p; c
0
t−2 + c
1
t−2 + c
0
t−3 + c
0
t+p−2 + c
1
t+p−2 + c
0
t+p−3)
=
∑
w;w′∈V2
c(s0t + s
0
t+p; w · ct−1 + w′ · ct+p−1)
c(w · ct−1 + w′ · ct+p−1; c0t−2 + c1t−2 + c0t−3 + c0t+p−2 + c1t+p−2 + c0t+p−3):
Now, we apply Theorem 5 to the :rst correlation in the product and get
c(s0t + s
0
t+p; w · ct−1 + w′ · ct+p−1)
=
∑
u∈V2
c(s0t ; w · ct−1 + u · x)c(s0t ; w′ · ct−1 + u · x):
From Table 2, we see that these correlations are nonzero if and only if u= (0; 0) and
w= w′ = (1; 0), or u= (1; 1) and w= w′ = (1; 0), or u= (0; 1) and w= w′ = (1; 1), or
:nally, u= (1; 0) and w = w′ = (1; 1).
The value w = w′ = (1; 1) leads to a longer correlation relation extending over at
least two rounds, and hence are expected be of less in amount. Therefore, we discard
the corresponding terms, and get a lower bound to the correlation from the remaining
terms with w = w′ = (1; 0) as follows:
c(c0t + c
0
t−1 + c
0
t−3 + c
0
t+p + c
0
t+p−1 + c
0
t+p−3; 0)
¿(c(s0t ; c
1
t−1)
2 + c(s0t ; ct−1 + x
1
t + x
2
t )
2)
c(c1t−1 + c
1
t+p−1; c
0
t−2 + c
1
t−2 + c
0
t−3 + c
0
t+p−2 + c
1
t+p−2 + c
0
t+p−3)
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=(c(s0t ; c
1
t−1)
2 + c(s0t ; ct−1 + x
1
t + x
2
t )
2)
∑
u∈V2
c(s1t−1; c
0
t−2 + u · x)2
= ((− 14 )2 + (14 )2)( 14 )2 = 2−7
using the correlation values given in Table 2.
It should be stressed, however, that the presented ultimate divide-and-conquer attack
is of theoretical nature, and practical only if the analyzer is given access to keystream
extending over periods of partial input. For example, the Bluetooth E0 algorithm in
its intended use generates only short segments of keystream to encrypt each payload,
maximum 2745 bits, starting from a new independent initial state.
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